Signs of Improvement in Matt Campbell’s Fourth Down Decision Making

Last year we analyzed Matt Campbell’s fourth down decisions at Toledo and compared them to Paul Rhoads and Art Briles that season. Today, we take a look at the results from Campbell’s first year in Ames and dive deeper into the decisions coaches face on fourth down.

In football, third down is often referred to as the “money down”. If an offense failed to gain the necessary yardage on their “money down,” it is often assumed some sort of kicking team will come out to attempt a punt or a field goal. We have evolved as football fans to believe and regurgitate the narratives we hear on television. Why is there any added emphasis on one particular down? There really shouldn’t be. There is a reason the rules allow you four downs to gain ten yards.

Humans tend to be risk averse. Presented with two options, we will typically choose the one with the lowest risk even if it has a lower reward attached. In the financial world, investors will often take a lower expected return with relatively known risks than a higher expected return with uncertain risks. Coaches are usually no different, and it costs them big time.

Running a play on fourth down is described as a risky proposition. Coaches that understand and implement the odds, are viewed as reckless gamblers. They are “throwing caution to the wind,” one might say. It seems like the higher the level of football, the more conservative football coaches get. Could it be because there is more on the line? Wouldn’t that be the time to tilt the odds in your favor?

As we assess Matt Campbell’s ability to make appropriate decisions on fourth down, it’s important to lay out the criteria. Like last year, we are comparing every fourth down decision Matt Campbell made last year to the New York Times 4th Down Bot’s theoretical decision. Here is where it gets a little tricky.

The 4th Down Bot assumes that time and score are not an issue. The algorithm only looks at down and distance. I have added a human element to give Campbell the benefit of the doubt when going for it on 4th and 10 when trailing with little time left and other situations that fit the mold.

First, let us take a quick look back at Campbell’s last season at Toledo.

One year ago I was pretty critical of Campbell’s decision making on fourth down. Quite frankly, I began digging into the data hoping (and expecting) to see how much better Campbell was at “following the book” on 4th down than Paul Rhoads was. Unfortunately, it wasn’t true. Remember, Paul Rhoads was at approximately 81.5% during his last season at Iowa State. As I stated last year, his decisions were also much easier due to distance and score.

With a different team in a different conference, we aren’t exactly comparing apples to apples when we compare Matt Campbell’s decisions in his first year at Iowa State to his last season at Toledo. Regardless, let us take a look.

Whether Matt Campbell has been reading Wide Right Natty Lite, or the wonderful water in Ames has made him smarter, he has made remarkable improvements with his fourth down decision making. One important note of improvement is that Campbell and offensive coordinator Tom Manning reduced the sheer number of fourth downs faced by 12, or exactly one per game. More on that later.

Fourth Down and Five Yards or Less to Gain

Anyone can make the decision to punt on 4th and 30. When the offense is stuck in neutral (or reverse) for the first three downs, the coaches hands are tied. The real pressure on a coach occurs on fourth down with five or fewer yards to gain. These are the important decisions coaches face.

In Campbell’s final season at Toledo he was less than stellar in these situations. Most likely it was because he was actually playing with the lead, and often times felt his team had the talent advantage in the MAC. That shouldn’t matter. A favorite making sub-optimal decisions allows a team with less talent (their opponent) to close the gap.

Switching from the role of the favorite to the position as an underdog, Campbell improved in this subset of fourth down decisions. Throwing caution to the wind and gambling could be listed as reasons why a team expected to lose might go for it more frequently on fourth down, but I’m hoping you are learning that neither of those are true. It’s simply just statistically beneficial. In each incorrect choice Campbell made in these situations, he was too conservative.

When an Iowa State opponent is facing fourth down with very few yards to gain are you hoping as a fan they punt, or go for it? I am going to take the guarantee of ending up with the ball (a punt) even if the field position might not be as good. Shouldn’t we have the same mindset when Iowa State is on offense?

I get frustrated when coaches voluntarily give up possession because they are playing the field position game. Coaches need to begin making decisions that put consistent pressure on their opponent. Utilizing all four downs is one way to do this.

Total Fourth Downs

During my sleepless nights of sifting through box scores on AOL, I began to notice a bit of a trend. It makes perfect sense and is kind of a no-brainer. How about, instead of making the correct fourth down decision, we just avoid them all together?!

It appears quality teams do this well. A simple look at the teams we’ve discussed thus far shows that limiting the amount of fourth downs faced increases point totals.

What about teams like Baylor who play at a blazing fast pace? I factored in pace of play to test the hypothesis for these types of teams. Below you will find pace adjusted statistics for total fourth downs faced compared to total points scored. With an extremely small sample size of four teams, the correlation was incredibly strong.

This should not come as a shock. The more successful an offense is on first and second down, the more points they should score. The advantage of making calculated fourth down decisions is offensive coordinators are not hamstrung with their play-calls early in the sequence.

One thought within the analytical community (I’ve heard because I’m not smart enough to be a member) is that coaches should act like they don’t have a kicker during the first three downs and especially after they get into opponent’s territory.

Making the whole playbook available presents difficulties for the defense and results in moving the chains on a more consistent basis.

The Verdict

As the analytics become more prevalent in sports, doing crazy things like going for it on 4th and 3 will become more acceptable. Just a few years ago, baseball analysts drooled over stats such as pitching wins and the RBI. Now, baseball is becoming as boring as ever thanks to teams realizing the value of true outcome players.

The point is, Campbell has the ability to exploit a market inefficiency in college football right now. Similar to how Fred Hoiberg began phasing out the long two point shot, Campbell could be a catalyst in a similar nature for college football.

Making quality fourth down decisions and treating the first three downs as though your punter broke their leg could, and should, ultimately lead to more points, and wins. After comparing his last season at Toledo to his first season at Iowa State, it appears he has made significant progress.

For Matt Campbell and Tom Manning, the goal this year should be to keep the entire playbook available on all downs. Being unpredictable on offense will eliminate some fourth downs faced and shorten the distance needed on the ones that they do. With an improved offensive line, and a quarterback capable of making “all the throws,” it isn’t too much to ask.

Treat all downs as “just another down” and we should hear “That’s another CYCLONE first down!!” early and often this football season.